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ABSTRACT 
An experimental system using precise time techniques is presently under con- 
struction and will be tested in 1974. It will provide accurate surveillance data 
to the ground based ATC sensors, high capacity data link ground-to-air and 
air-to-ground, navigation services and air-to-air collision avoidance and 
proximity warning service. The de~ ign  takes into account the large disparity in 
electronic equipment among the various classes of users, The user of the air- 
space installs only that equipment required for the services he needs. 
BACKGROUND 
The aircraft using the civil airspace of the United States may be divided roughly 
into 2600 air-carrier aircraft, 140,000 general aviation aircraft and 20,000 
military aircraft. The general aviation aircraft range from very well equipped 
Gulfstream I1 and Learjet corporate aircraft down to very small general aviation 
aircraft with almost no electronic equipment. However, the vadt major- 
ity of the general aviation fleet is  comprised of single engine aircraft of 300 
Horsepower o r  under with an electrical system and a fair market value of perhaps 
$10,000. The military fleet also ranges from superbly equipped C-5Ats and 
C-"11's down to primary and basic trainers which a r e  not really equipped to 
venture into civil airspace and do not do eo. 
The problem facing the FAA is  that of implementing and operating a system that 
gives this wide spectrum of users  the services they require at a price they a re  
willing and able to pay. An a i r  carr ier  turbojet costs between $5 million and 
$25 million to buy and between $500 and $2,000 an hour to operate. A typical 
general aviation aircraft, a s  noted above, is  worth $10,000 and costs $20 - $30 
per hour to operate. Within reason, the cost of avionics is  not important to the 
air  carr ier  so long a s  it  reduces delay and/or increases safety. Delay i s  not 
particularly important to the typical general aviation operator but cost, both 
initial and maintenance, i s  very important. 
The present civil a i r  traffic control system is based on the Air Traffic Control 
Radar Beacon System (ATCRBS), This system is essentially identical to the 
mllitary IFR system except that FAA interrogators do not transmit any of the 
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cryptographic messages used by the military. The ATCRBS is based on World 
War I1 technology and is beaming to reveal shcrrtcomings as more and 
more aircraft a re  equipped with transponders and begin to use the airspace. 
Many of these difficulties arise from the fact that all aircraft which receive a 
valid interrogation answer it. This causes interfence or,  in FAA jargon "fruit 
and garble. " The interference becomes worst when aircraft a r e  flying close 
togethzr wbich, of course, is just when high quality surveillance eta  a r e  
required. 
There a re  other factors which influence the choice of a system. The present 
a i r  traffic control system is very costly to operate because it  is very l a b r  
intensive, meaning + h t  there a r e  m-y controllers watching traffic displays 
and issuing control instructions and advisories via VHF o r  UHF voice mdio. 
It would be very desirable to use computers b aid the controllers in their tasks. 
If the computers are to provide a useful service that increases safety they will 
have to be able to communicate with the aircraft directly and send bbort digitally 
encoded messages. This, of course, implies a data link both groud-to-air and 
air-to-ground. The air- to-pund link is aessary to verii;~ that tile correct 
message was received in the aircraft as well a s  for the pilot to sew! simple 
messages such a s  "emergencyff and "radio failure. " 
Navib-tion in the civil airspace is based upon the Very High-Frequency Omnirange 
(VOR) and Distance Measuring Equipment (DME). The DME is essentially iden- 
tical to the military TACAN except that civil DME equipment reads out only raqge 
I 
and/ r range rate to the selected station instead of the range and bearing read 
out by a military TACAN set. The FAA installs both VOR and TACAN at most 
navigatiotlal fixes. Such an installation is called a VORTAC and provides service 
to civil and military users. Carriage of DME equipment i s  mandatory now for 
fligbt above 24,000 feet and *&is level will probably come down in fie near future. 
Furher ,  2 larger percentage of the general aviation pilots a r e  beginning to fly 
I-ader Instrument Flight Rules (IFR) and find DME a convenience. Much like 
the ATCRBS, as more and more aircraft ard equipped with DME the groiid 
portion of the system begins to saturate. The actual saturation pcint depends 
upon the puise repetition frequency of the sirborne equipment but a typical number 
for today's system is that around 100 aircraft interrogating a given VORTAC 
begin to degrade its performance, It is reasonably clear that this could become 
a serious problem in busy airspace such as the Lo8 Angeles Basin o r  anywhere in 
the corridor from Washingtou, D. C., to Boston. Another problem with the DME 
system is  cost. The least expensive airborne DME is $1500. Air car r ier  sets 
run well above $1 0,000. 
Yet another facet of the problem facing the FAA is the real possibility that an 
air-tc -air collision avoidance or proximi3 warning eystem will be made manda- 
tory by Congress. There aze bills in both the Senate and the House dire- 
the FAA to select such systems arul require their installation and use in all air- 
craft, air carrier, military and general aviation. The systems presently being 
proposed a r e  expensive and complex and would impose yet more maintenance 
problems on aircraft operators. This rather lengthy etatement of the FAA 
problem of selecting a design can thus be summarized as follows: 
a. A new ~ u r ~ e i l l a n c e  system is needed which is more accurate and reliable 
and cbes not exhibit interference problems as thc density of traffic builds 
UP* 
b. A reliable, high capacity digital data link is needed which will permit 
increased use of automation to reduce controller workload and also to 
increase safety. 
c. A non-saturable DME is ueeded as more operators use this ser~ice. 
d. An air-derived collision avoidance and/or proximity warning system will 
probably be made mawlatory by Congress. 
e. The cost must be kept a s  low as possible so that general aviation operators 
can .Ifford to participate in the system. 
PROPOSED SOLUTION - GENERAL REMARKS 
It should be no surprise that a paper prepared f ~ r  a Precise Time and Time 
Interval Planning Conference should propcse a solution which is based upon the 
powerful properties of a system using precise time. As will be seen below, the 
system is carefully tailored to meet the cost constraint. The precise time- 
keeping is done by the ground-based system. Thus the basic general aviation 
transpander Is essentially tbe same as a present ATCRBS transponder and only 
speaks when spoken to. The more sophisticated users  of the airspace would in- 
stall more complex avionics fi they desired the DhlE and the collision avoidance 
o r  proximity warning ssntice. An aircraft with this equipvent would receive 
and process signals with only the basic transponder. 
The FAA is already well underway to so!ving the improved sumeillance and data 
link problems. It appears that most of the difficulties with the present ATCRBS 
system can be overcome by a discretely addressed beacon system wherein each 
Lrcraft responds only when interrogated with its unique digital identity. This 
technique would reduce the number of interrogations per  aircraft by a factor of 
a t  least 10, would eliminate synchronous garble, and would also permit the 
transmission of shourt digital messages to each aircraft. These messages would 
be encoded as part of the discretely addressed interrogation and only the ad- 
dressed aircraft wculd decode the message and display i t s  contents to the pilot. 
A discrete-address beacon system (DABS) is presently being developed by the 
FAA. 
Historically, the FAA t a d  the aviation communitJ; a t  large have bccn slow to 
implement new ground or airborne systems. It can be anticipated that DABS 
will be implemented slowly, beginning at a few large airports. Thus it will be 
difficult to convince the aviation community to purchase and install DABS trans- 
ponders unless these transponders would also perform the ATCRBS function in 
outlying areas that were not yet DABS-equipped. The ATCRBS is widely installed in 
aircraft  and protected by treaties; hence, ATCRBS equipped aircraf t  will have 
to be serviced for  a long period in the future. Thus it appears that any new DABS 
ground installations must be compatible with ATCRBS transponders, and new 
DABS transponders must function in the ATCRBS mode when flown in areas not 
yet converted to DABS. In addition, it is desired to keep the tramponder design 
as simple and inexpensive as possible in order  to not impose an unnecessary 
financial burden on the owners and operators of the 135,000 general aviation 
aircraft in the present U. S. civil fleet, The dual constraints of compatibility 
with the ATCRBS system and low cost imply strongly that the DABS system 
should use the same frequencies as the ATCRBS; viz. . 1030 MHz for interroga- 
tion and 1090 MHz for  aircraft  response. 
The present ATCRBS interrogation of aircraft  is relatively undisciplined. Care 
is taken to adjust the pulse repetition frequencies (PRF) of neighboring inter- 
rogators so that they a r e  different, assuring that the condition kdown a s  "synchro- 
nous fruit" will be only momentary. Other features such a s  sidelobe suppression 
and reply-rate limiting are included in the ATCHBS to reduce interference. 
Nevertheless, many of the present problems of the ATCRBS a r e  due to the lack 
of discipline in the ground-based system. 
The DABS concept envisions sending digital data fmn: the ground to  the air- 
craft and from the aircraft to  the ground. It is clear  that the addition of 
a DABS to the present ATCRBS system without imposing some form of discipline 
on the interrogation scheduling would have an adverse effect on the ATCRBS 
system and also provide a low messrge reliability in DABS unless design tech- 
niques employing different modulation and e r r o r  detecting o r  e r ro r  detecting 
coding were employed. These techniques would add to the cost of the transponder 
and do little to solve the present ATCRBS problems. 
PROFQSED SOLUTION - SPECIFIC CONCEPT 
One of the concepts being examined by the FAA has a name derived from syn- 
chronized discrete address beacon system, SY NCHRO-DABS. The basic concept 
i s  strrightforwarci. The ground-based system adjusts the timing of the trans- 
missio~l  of an interrogation such that it reaches the particular a ircraf t  addressed; 
it i s  receircc! 2nd .'i'coded; and the aircraft  begins i t s  response at selected peri- 
odic intervals. The  effect is as if the aircraft  carr ied on b a r d  a cesium o r  
rebidium clock of great precision. It i s  thus possible to use some of the power- 
ful techniques associated with common precision timing without requiring complex 
airborne equipment. 
Figure 1 shows one form of the possible overall timing of thesystem. Aprecision 
100 Hz PRF' i s  chosen. Each 2 5 0 0 ~ s  pulse repetition period (PRP) may be 
thought of a s  beginning with a "tirrre-zero" timing pulse. 
Consider each 2500Ps PRP to be divided into four 6 2 5 ~ s  egments of time. The 
segment just before time zero is used to send out discretely-addressed ground 
interrogations; the segment after time zero is used to receive the response 
elicited from the aircraft, which were discretely addressed. (Rather than impose 
periodicity on the ground transmissions of the interrogations, the system imposes 
periodicity when an aircraft  received the interrogations. ) The remaining two 
segments a r e  used for transmitting ATCRBS interrogations and receiving 
ATCRBS replies. The time of transmission of the ATCRBS interrogation is 
shown dotted to indicate that the time of transmission i s  jittered a t  each s i te  to 
preclude neighboring sites from having the same instantaneous PRF and causing 
the phenomenon known a s  synchronous fruit. This is necessary because, unlike 
the present ATCRBS system, al l  s i tes  have exactly the same average PRF in the 
SYNCHRO-DABS system. 
Figure ? shows in more detail the activity during the time devoted to the 
SYNCHRO-DABSfuncticn. Assume that four aircraft, whose ranges a r e  precisely 
known to the ground system, a r e  to be intezrogr~ted during the particular PRP 
shown. Aircraft 1 i s  the farthest away; aircraft  I i s  the nearest. The discrete 
interrogations a r e  transmitted in the order  shown with timing such that they reach 
the aircraft, a r e  ciecoded, and each aircraft  begins i t s  response at time zero. 
These responses a r e  received a t  the ground in the inverse order  to that with which 
they had been transmitted. It i s  clearly necessary, when deciding which aircraft to 
interrogate during a single PRP, to choose aircraft  whose ranges from the inter- 
rogator differ by more that the message length times the velocity of light, in this 
case approximately 5 nmi. The time separation of the DABS and ATCRBS functions 
thus eliminates interference between these two modes a t  least a s  fa r  a s  the one 
ground s i te  i s  concerned. 
Next, assume that a l l  ground sites a r e  similarly synchronized in time and, 
further, that the airport surveillance radars  (ASR) with a nominal rotation period 
of I s are also synchronized in azimuth a s  indicated in Figure 3. The dotted 
lines indicate the area over which each s i te  performs i t s  surveillance function. 
Except when handing off an aircraft  from one s i te  to another and when a facility 
fails and neighboring facilities must pick up the load, each interrogator would 
only address aircraft within i ts assigned area. The combined effects of 
synchronizing both time and azimuth angle will reduce interference between 
adjacent s i tes  to a minimal level. Any garbled replies that might still occur 
would be resolved by reinterrogation. The schedulingof interrogations a s  depicted 
in Figure 1 will give a non-ambiguous radar  range of 101 nmi. The FAA also operates 
a i r  route surveillance radars  (ARSR) that have a requirement for 200 nmi range 
and typically have a rotation period of 15 s. These facilities would require 
back-to-back antennas, one doing ATCRBS full time and one doing DABS full 
time. The timing of the interrogations wou'ld be  synchronized a s  in th? case 
of the ASR's and any garbled replies would be resolved by reinterrogation. 
The format of the possible DABS interrogation transmission is a s  shown in Figure 
4. Interrogationis conducted at 1030 MHz ( a s  in the present ATCRBS system), i s  
amplitude modulated, and at a nominal 500 W level. The coding is based on 
0.25 ps b widths. FR, and FR, a r e  3 \3 p:ises that serve the functions of sup- 
pressing the ATCRBS transponders receiving the signal and also of providing 
level setting and bit synchronizing sigpals to the DABS decoding circuitry. The 
identity block contains 24 b that permit upwards of 1,000,000 discrete addresses. 
The next 5 b a r e  "housekeeping bits" and their individual functions will be de- 
cribed shortly. The following 5 b  a r e  used for messages type and allow for up to 
32 different message types. The next 42 b a r e  for message. (The number 42 
allows for transmissioii of seven alphanumeric characters per  interrogation 
using a truncated ASCII code of 6 b/character. ) This is followed by a 3 b framing 
pulse F R 3. 
Figure 5 shows the aircraft response to a discrete interrogation. The reply 
begins 3 p s  after the leading edge of FR3, to bc consistent with present ATCRBS 
practice. The aircraft  transmits a t  1090 nilHz and repeats the interrogation 
exactly as received and decoded except for the change in ca r r i e r  frequency from 
1030 to 1090 MHz. After repeating the interrogation, the aircraft  can add on 7 b 
of aircraft-generated message, 11 b encoding tlie aircraft barometric altitude, 
and a final framing pulse. The e r r o r  checking thus is done by the ground-based 
system and if the response does not match exactly the interrogation that was 
sent, the aircraft i s  reinterrogated. 
A design goal i s  to make aircraft  entry into the system automatic without adding 
to either the pilot o r  controller workload. A "general-call" signal format is 
shown in Figure 6. The 24 identity bits a r e  all  se t  a t  "1'' and the message type 
indicates that this is a general call. Any aircraft that had not been discretely 
addressed within the last 20 s would respond to this general call and would in- 
sert  its own identify in the identity block in place of the 24 ones. It would also 
add its altitude bits. The interrogator would add this identity and postion into 
the memory of the ground system and begin to interrogate the aircraft discretely. 
The aircraft would no longer respond to the general call. 
A method of resolving garbles in replies to general calls would also be needed 
when, for instance, one surveillance site suffered a failure and an adjacent site 
was instructed to pick up the load. If a site detected a garbled reply to a general 
call, it would revert to a semidiscrete interrogation mode whereby it would begin 
setting some of the 24 ones to zero in the identity block. Those aircraft, which 
had ones in the corresponding position of their own identity, would not answer 
this general call. 
In the system described above, each DABS-transponder-equipped aircraft flying 
in airspace covered by the ground-based interrogator will periodically transmit, 
at a precisely defined time, its identity and altitude. Any aircraft operator who 
desired a collision avoidance system based on air-derived data could install a 
1090RIHz receiver in this aircraft. Each aircraft i s  ground-synchronized 
whenever it  i s  interrogated, and i t  i s  then possible to install a crystal- 
stabilized oscillator to maintain synchronization and predict the times of 
occurrence of time zero in the interval between interrogations. An aircraft that 
listens at 1090MHz and also has such a crystal-stabilized clock can then compute 
the range of other aircraft based upon the time of arrival of their signals. 
Further, the receivingaircraft can compare the present range of another aircraft 
with its range measured at a prior response and calculate range rate. The alti- 
tude of the other aircraft is also known because it i s  encoded in its transmission. 
An aircraft receiving these signals thus derives the range, range rate, and alti- 
tude of other aircraft around it and makes determinations a s  to which, if any, of 
these aircraft constitute a threat. 
It is  also feasible to install a small direction-finding antenna on the listening 
aircraft so that the relative bearing of each nearby aircraft can be displayed to 
the pilot. Figure 7 shows such an antenna, which is now being tested for this 
purpose at 1090 MHz. Figure 8 shows the antenna on a light aircraft. 
The proximity warning o r  collision avoidance system described in the preceding 
paragraph has shortcomings in that it fails if the ground-based system fails, and 
it only functions in that airspace that has radar coverage. Present planning is  
that an automated ground-based collision-avoidance service using the DABS data 
link to send ground-calculated collision-avoidance messages will also be available 
wherever adequate radar coverage exists. The SYNCHRO-DABS concept can 
eliminate this shortcoming by putting simple "gap-filler" interrogators and data- 
process'ng equipment at very high frequency omnirange (VOR) stations of which 
there a r e  almost 1000 covering the U. S. These interrogators would have fixed 
aatennas with omnidirectional azimuth coverage. The primary function of these 
s :icr?s would be to send out discrete interrogations to keep DABS-equipped a i r -  
craft transmitting and properly sychronized. This i s  possible since azimuth 
does not c-.ter into the timing adjustment for airborne synchronization. No use 
would be  made of the range data on the ground nor would a i r  traffic control mes- 
sages be  sent on the data-link channel. An aircraft equipped with the 1090 MHz 
receiver could now get an independent air-derived collision-avoidance separa- 
tion service from all transponder equipped aircraft as long a s  it flew in air-  
space within line of sight of a VOR (which takes in most of the usable airspace). 
The interrogations transmitted by these facilities placed a t  VOR sites and the 
responses elicited from aircraft  would not interfere with the operation of the 
DABS facility that was performing a surveillance function for ATC purposes. 
As an example, consider a VOR si te  located in a valley 50 mi from a DABS site. 
The VOR si te  would use only, for instance, every 1/10 o r  1/20 PRP of the 100/s 
available. The DABS si te  computer would be programmed to not use those PRP's 
while working the airspace over the valley in which the VOR was located. Neigh- 
boring VOR's would be assigned different PRP's to avoid interference. The 
interrogators a t  the VOR si tes  could also provide the synchronizing service in an 
area served by a DABS si te  if the DABS site failed and there w:re either no 
neighboring DABS si tes  to pick up the load o r  the neighboring DABS si te  also 
failed. 
The requirement for, and use of, the housekeeping bits shown in Figure 4 can 
now be discussed. It i s  desired that the DABS sites, i. e., those using the re- 
sponses for surveillance inputs to the ATC system, should take precedence 
over the VOR sites. The DABS bit in the discretely addressed interrogation 
and in the general call interrogation means that these signals a r e  transmitted 
by a DABS facility rather than a VOR facility. A transponder being interrogated 
discretely by a VOR facility would still respond to a DABS general call and be 
acquired automatically by the DABS. After being interrogated discretely by the 
DABS, it would no longer answer the VOR, and the VOR would drop the track 
after a few tries. Similarly, an aircraft  flying from airspace covered by a 
DABS into airspace covered only by a VOR would cease to receive the DABS 
interrogations and wculd answer the VOR general call automatically and be pick- 
ed up and tracked in range by the VOR. 
The synchronized bit in the interrogation also requires some explanation. The 
4 s rotation period of the ASR antenna and the 10 s period of the ARSR indicate 
that any tracking and predict'on system will hcve at least 4 s between data'samples. 
This will not allow the prediction of range with an accuracy such that the timing 
of the aircraft response will be within some nomilla1 error,  such a s  100 ns. In 
addition, the azimuthal estimation on the ground is  to be done by monopulse 
techniques. The interrogator antenna beam shape changes with elevation angle 
so  that it appears prudent to get a target response on each side of the monopulse 
difference null and perform interpolation to estimate the azimuth. The SYNCHRO- 
DABS will send two interrogations per scan. The first interrogation will not have 
the synchronized bit set and will be used to obtain true present range to the aircraft. 
The second interrogation occurs a few PRP's later and on the other side of the antenna 
null and will be a properly timed interrogation with the synchronized bit set a t  
one. The aircraft that carried clocks would use this interrogation to reset  their 
clocks. Each aircraft retransmits the interrogation as  received, including the 
synchronized bit. Aircraft that were equipped to receive at 1090MHz would only 
process those signals from other aircraft which had the synchronized bit set. 
OTHER FUNCTIONS 
The availability of precise time makes it possible to offer other services to the 
aircraft operator at a very modest increase in cost and complexity of the air- 
borne equipment. The signal shown in Figure 9 would be broadcast ten times per 
second at zero time 1030 MHz from the omnidirectional antennas located a t  thc! VOR 
sites. The identity i s  the identity of that particular navigational fix; the message 
type indicates it a s  a VOR navigational signal; the message contains the latitude 
and longitude of the VOR to a precision of 100 ft; and the altitude is the altitude 
of the VOR. The identity code of the VOR would be published in the various 
aeronautical navigation documents and also keyed to the VOR VHF frequency in 
a manner similar to the present practice with distance-measuring equipment 
(DME). The pilot of an aircraft that had this feature installed would simply 
select, with thumb-wheel switches, the identity of the fix of which he wished to 
know the distance and the transponder would decode that signal and display the 
range based upon time of arrival of this signal after zero time. The identity 
could also be selected automatically by simply tuning the VOR receiver, exactly 
a s  in present practice. 
A more sophisticated aircraft could receive and process signals from several 
VOR facilities and compute its position by triangulation. The pilot of this more 
sophisticated aircraft does not have to manually enter the location of the fix be- 
cause this information i s  contained in the received signal. The computer in the 
aircraft would select those three locations that gave the best geometry and com- 
pute position and course including altitude correction. Thus a precise area 
navigation function would be provided wherever reception of signais from two or 
three VOR facilities was available. 
PILOT'S DISPLAY 
The information sent from the ground o r  derived in the transponder from receipt 
of other signals must be displayed to the pilot in a clear and unambiguous man- 
ner such that it does not add to his workload. The displays shown here repre- 
sent only one possible implementation. Presumably, any other suitable display 
that a manufacturer offered for sale and an owner wanted to buy would be satis- 
factory. (The SYNCHRO-DABS transponder would be available in several levels 
of performance and cost.) Figure 10 shows the proposed display for the mini- 
mum-level transponder. This transponder would respond to ATCRBS interro- 
gations if not being discretely addressed and would decode collision-avoidance 
messages from the ground-based system. The array of lights on the periphery 
indicates the relative bearing and relative altitude of nearby aircraft a s  perceived 
and relayed-up by the ground-based system. There a r e  12 azimuthal positions 
corresponding to the presently used "o-clock" system. Each azimuthal position 
has three relative altitude lights. The middle light indicates traffic within 500 ft. 
of own altitude, the upper light indicates traffic 500-2000 ft. above, and the 
lower light indicates traffic 500-2000 ft. below. These lights would be energized 
when nonthreatening traffic was within, say 1.5 mi of a low-speed aircraft. If 
the range rate of the traffic was such that it could cause a collision within 30 s, 
the appropriate light would be flashed. Just a s  the outer lights indicate the posi- 
tion of traffic, the inner lights indicate recommended action. The pilot can be 
told to  either DO o r  DON'T DO certain maneuevers. The DON'T DO crosses 
a r e  in red and the DO arrows a r e  in green. In the general case when a maneuver 
command is  given to a VFR aircraft, two choices will be given whenever possible. 
This is done so  a s  not to vector the pilot into a cloud in order to avoid a colli- 
sion. In the example shown, the pilot is told to turn right (standard rate turn) 
but that a dive maneuver is acceptable If a right turn is n ~ t  desirable. The com- 
mand indicator lights will be flashed if the command i s  from the ground and is  
mandatory. They will be simply turned on if the command is  advisory o r  an ac- 
ceptable alternative to a mandatory command. Each maneuver (climb, dive, 
left, r:,-ht) can have either a green arrow or  a red cross displayed. 
Figure 11 shows a display that combines the collision-avoidance messages and 
ATC vectoring and frequency information on a single 3-1/8-in instrument. Any 
ATC messages would be displayed by flashing the numerals until the pilot pushed 
the WILCO button to acknowledge that he had received and would follow the in- 
structions. Other possible displays would include alphanumeric readouts that 
could a l s ~  display short clearances. It is  expected that the ATC system of the 
future will be highly automated and that those aircraft with the ATC data link 
display could file for better routing and get better service. In a few of the major 
terminals, viz., New York, it will probably be necessary for an aircraft to have 
such a display for using the major airport facilities. 
The aircraft owner who purchases a DABS transponder with a synchronized clock 
would also be provjded with the DME service or, a s  an alternative, area naviga- 
tion. The owner who purchased the updated clock and the 1090MHz receiver plus 
direction-finding antenna would also have displayed the location of all nearby 
transponder-equipped traffic and those aircraft that constitute a possible threat. 
This information would be displayed on the same instrument a s  the information 
from the ground-based system. However, the service would be available in air- 
space not covered by the surveillance system and would also be available if the 
gromd-based collision-avoidance function failed. (There would be a hiatus 
lasting for a few seconds after the ground-based system failed and while the 
VOR's pick up the interrogation load. ) 
MODULATION AND CODING 
Amplitude modulation with nonreturn-to-zero format is shown for SYNCHRO- 
DABS because of the constraints of compatibility with the present ATCRBS sys- 
tem and low cost. It is clear that any of the constant-envelope phase-modulation 
schemes (PSK, DPSK, FSIC, Quadriphase, etc. ) would give 6-8 db better perfor- 
mance in the presence of receiver noise or random interfering signals. However, 
the signal-to-thermal-noise ratio will generally be in excess of 20 db, the disci- 
pline of interrogations should reduce the incidence of interfering signals to a 
minimal level, and the reinterrogation procedure will resolve remaining prob- 
lems. Further, interference, if i t  occurs, can be over a 40db dynamic range 
with respect to the desired signal so that it i s  not at all clear that the added cost 
of the 6-8 db improvement of a constant envelope system would be justified. It 
can also be shown, with reasonable assumptions, that the signal-to-noise ratio 
of the signals used for monopulse azimuth estimation would be approximately 
20db higher for a constant envelope system than for an amplitude-modul~ted sys- 
tem (more energy, coherent detection). However, i t  appears that the azimuthal 
estimation er rors  due to thermal noise in a system using amplitude modulation 
will be smaller than er rors  caused by antenna imperfections and possible multi- 
path effects. The same general arguments apply to the decision to not include 
error-detecting o r  error-correctin? codes. These codes increase cost and re- 
duce capacity. In the case of er ror  detection, the transponder would simply not 
reply and would be reinterrogated. In the absence of an error-detecting system, 
the interrogator would receive a reply different from the interrogation that was 
transmitted and would reinterrogate. The effcctis the same in either case. Simply 
coding on urgent messages, such as collision-avoidance maneuver messages, is 
being considered. This coding would consist of repeating the message twice during 
the 42 b message block and designing the transponder logic circuitry so that it 
required both message segments to match before energizing the display. 
PROGRAM STATUS 
The FAA is sponsoring the construction of the experimental SYNCHRO-DABS 
system described above. The Naval Weapons Center, China Lake, California, will 
provide three sets  of airborne equipment and the DOT Transportation Systems 
Center at Cambridge, Massachusetts, is fabricating an omni-directional inter- 
rogator which will also transmit navigational signals a s  described above. Test- 
ing of this system will be conducted at our National Aviation Facility Experimental 
Center near Atlantic City and will begin in the spring of 1974. ?'he testing will 
explore the accuracy and convenience of the air-to-air mode and the accuracy of 
the DME function. 
A few points about the evolving design may be of interest. It is desired to k e q  
cost a s  low a s  possible. Thus the use of a cesium, rubidium or methane clock 
in the aircraft i s  out of the question. The clock will use a quartz crystal con- 
trolled oscillator which must be within lOppm of the nominal freguency. Such 
an oscillator does not need to be in an oven and can use a $1.50 crystal. Simple 
digital counter circuitry then adds o r  substracts pulses such that the clock e r ro r  
is never more than 50 nano-seconds, assuming that a synchronizing signal is 
received at least every 15 seconds from the ground-based system. The displays 
being procured use light emitting diodes for the traffic warning lights and in- 
cadescent bulbs for the "DO" and "D0N'T"commands and for the digital indica- 
tors. These displays a r e  expensive and consume a lot of power. The newly 
emerging liquid crystal technology appears to offer an attractive, reliable and 
low-cost alternative for such displays and experimental units a re  being procured 
for test. 
SUMMARY 
The SYNCHRO-DABS provides a method of introducing the DABS function into 
the ATC system so that it  is  completely compatible with the ATCHBS. It also 
provides additional navigation and collision-avoidance services to those operators 
who desire it. A key point is that the location of all aircraft with the basic min- 
imum DABS transponder can be displayed to the pilot of any aircraft that has 
the optional air-derived collision-avoidance equipment. 
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QUESTION AND ANSWER PERIOD 
DR. RLDER: 
Does anybody have any questions of Mr. Amlie's paper  ? 
MR. MOHR (McDonnell-Douglas): 
I didn't rea l ly  understand how you got the airplane synchronized with the ground 
station. Maybe you didn't go into i t  o r  maybe I missed it. 
MR. AMLIE: 
The ground station knows the range of the aircraft, and t ransmi t s  - backs off 
the t ime of interrogation so that the interrogation is received a t  the a i rc ra f t  at 
zero time. The ground does  the timing. 
MR. MOHR: 
Thank you. 
DR. REDER: 
Any o ther  questions? Yes, please, Dr. Henderson. 
DR. HENDERSON: 
My question i s  very simple. 
Have you any references to present publications which descr ibe  your  sys tem ? 
MR. AMLIE: 
As a mat te r  of fact, I have a briefcase full of IEEE a r t i c les  1 wrote. 
DR. HENDERSON: 
I will s e e  you later. 
DR. REDER: 
Any other  questions ? 
(No response. ) 
